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Abstract 
 
Former research detected the paradox of high quality formal institutional 
background accompanied by a low level of social trust in the United Kingdom. 
The aim of the current paper is to solve this initial puzzle. As traditional social 
capital literature is not able to explain the low level of trust in this case, we 
propose a comprehensive approach incorporating the analysis of immigration, 
integration, inequality and access to justice data to shed light on trust-
eliminating mechanisms. The social and economic aspects are examined in the 
matrix of extra-community network, intra-community trust, radius of trust and 
need for formal external enforcement. Four factors – concentrated highly 
diverse areas, tight communities living next to each other with limited extra-
community links, minorities’ high exposure to deprivation and limited access to 
justice – are identified as the origin of our puzzle. As social trust plays a 
fundamental role in enhancing economic growth, the trust-impeding mechanisms 
explored in the current paper shall be of great importance. 
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1. Introduction 
Former research has shown that in the case of a gradually diminishing 
level of ethical norms the result is a larger degree of corrupt practices, which is 
generally followed by efforts to make regulations stricter. The process leads to a 
more complicated and less transparent legal system, that derogates the 
enforceability of contracts (Ménard, 2000), increases the costs of regulation and, 
by having repercussions on ethical norms, it further deteriorates them (Török, 
2007).  
Hodosi (2011) argued that a low level of social trust
1
 tends to be 
accompanied by a complicated legal system posing high administrative burden
2
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on the given economy. She examined the correlation between the costs of 
regulation – given by the costs of administrative burdens – and social trust in 25 
European Union member states
3
. In general, her findings supported the argument 
of the existing theoretical literature, but two exceptions have been detected. One 
of them is the case of the United Kingdom where low administrative costs are 
paired with a low level of social trust.  
The current paper aims to explore this paradox and answer the question: 
how is it possible that in a ‘country’ where the quality of formal institutional 
background is exceptionally high, there are no sufficient levels of social trust to 
make the majority of the population trust each other (WVS, 2008). Simplifying, 
we will show why people do not trust each other in general.  
The article consists in the following structure. The second section starts 
with an introduction to traditional social capital literature, after which the 
theoretical background of social structure is discussed. In the third chapter we 
explore the immigration trends since the 1900s and show the newcomers’ 
exposure to inequality and deprivation. It is followed by the analysis of 
geographical concentration and social homogeneity to explore social 
fragmentation. In the end, the access to justice is studied from the low-income 
sub-population’s perspective. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Extensive literature deals with the question of social trust and its origin as 
part of social capital
4
 research. We can distinguish two separate theoretical 
approaches in this regard, one that focuses on society and its level of part-taking 
in voluntary associations (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993), and one that 
emphasises the importance of formal institutional background in generating 
social trust (Levi, 1998; Rothstein, 2005).  
 According to the former approach, belonging to voluntary organisations 
holds a significant role in creating society-wide trust. Despite the fact that 
around 50% of the population volunteered under the supervision of organisations 
                                                                                                                                   
1 We use the term ‘trust’ with the following meaning: “A trusts B to do X. The act of trust is the 
knowledge or belief that the trusted will have an incentive to do what she engages to do.” (Levi, 
1998, p.78). 
“Social trust is defined as trust in strangers; trust in people with whom we are not previously 
acquainted.” (Herreros and Criado, 2009, p.339). 
2 Administrative burdens are defined here as information obligation of businesses and third sector 
“which are carried out solely because of a legal requirement at EU level.” (European Commission, 
2012, p.7). 
3 The paper explored the mentioned correlation within the framework of cross-national analysis 
using World Values Survey data of measuring social trust and European Commission’s data set of 
administrative burdens for 25 EU countries. (Hodosi, 2011). 
4 “Social Capital can be defined simply as a set of informal values or norms shared among 
members of a group that permits cooperation among them.” (Fukuyama, 2000, p.16). 
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between 1981 and 1999 (WVS, 2012), society as a whole was not able to 
generate social trust in the UK
5
 (WVS, 2008), thus we cannot explain the 
experienced paradox within this framework
6
.  
On the other hand, based on the arguments of the institutional approach, 
we expect to find a poor level of formal institutions in the UK, as it would give 
an explanation to our initial puzzle. To have an insight, the features of good 
governance shall be reviewed. Although extended research is dealing with the 
definition of the concept, the main factors are accountability, transparency, 
effectiveness, efficiency and consistency (Abdellatif, 2003; Jalilian et al, 2006), 
which are measured by the World Bank in the form of Good Governance 
Indicators. According to these indexes, the level of rule of law exceeded 90% 
during the period of 1996-2010 and the voice and accountability indicator was 
above 90% or occasionally just below it (Kaufmann et al, 2010, p.4). The level 
of government effectiveness and regulatory quality also surpassed the 90% 
threshold, indicating that the UK has an excellent regulatory environment, 
provides high quality public services, policy designing and implementation thus 
creating an advanced level of transparency and consistency.  
Within the group of scholars who emphasize the importance of formal 
institutions, Rothstein (2011) represents a slightly different concept. He argues 
that the “legal and administrative branches of the state responsible for 
implementing public policies” (Rothstein, 2011, p.151) and the general trust in 
these institutions are the most important factors in generating social trust.  
Following his argument we highlight some further measures: equality by 
law is constantly ensured and 75.70% of the population expressed high 
confidence in the police
7
 (WVS, 2012b), while the majority of people trusted the 
justice system
8
 (WVS, 2012c), but just 28.5% found that most people could be 
trusted in general (WVS, 2008). 
As we have seen, traditional approaches are not able to explain the low 
level of trust. Despite of the positive volunteering attitude of society and the 
presence of the necessary political and legal institutions, these circumstances 
proved to be unsatisfactory to create a high-trust environment in the United 
Kingdom. As a consequence, we suggest that although high quality formal 
institutional background is a necessary condition in generating social trust, it is 
not a sufficient one. To overcome this phenomenon, we seek the solution in the 
framework of migration research combined with social trust theory. 
                                                     
5 67.4% felt that they can never be cautious enough with other people in 1999. 
6 It reinforces the findings of opposing scholars of the theory (Newton, 1999; Uslaner, 1999), who 
found no positive connection between voluntary membership and social trust. 
7 A great deal of confidence: 27%, Quite a lot of confidence: 48.7% between 1981 and 1999. 
8 A great deal of confidence: 13.8%, Quite a lot of confidence: 41.8%; 55.6% in total between 
1981 and 1999. 
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Although comprehensive literature analysed the relationship between 
immigration and social capital measured as volunteering and membership in 
associations stressing a negative correlation between them (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2007), 
few studied social trust as an independent variable (Delhey and Newton, 2005; 
Herreros and Criado, 2009). In the latter case researchers focused on cross-
national analysis and explored statistical correlation between ethnical 
fragmentation and trust, but none of them concentrated on within-country 
analysis exploiting immigration, integration and inequality data in the same time 
to explore their combined effect on social trust. 
The current paper aims to provide the reader with a comprehensive insight 
to explore the combined mechanism of the above mentioned social and 
economic aspects on social trust
9
. We propose the hypothesis that trust is 
undermined by two interlinked aspects of the Kingdom: 1, high-degree social 
heterogeneity and socio-economic inequality generated mainly by immigration 
and 2, despite the clear and transparent legal system, access to justice is limited 
in the low-income sub-population. 
 
2.1. Social heterogeneity and socio-economic inequalities 
  As we plan to explore not just immigration data, but the evolved detriment 
in integration and equality as well, we start our analysis by examining the 
features of social structure from the perspective of trust. 
  Theorists argued that trust, norms and networks as the main components 
of social capital are crucial to build an efficient society (Putnam, 1993).  
Identical norms (or formal external enforcement options) are the basis of 
generalised trust that cannot show its positive society-wide effect without 
sufficient networks. 
  It is important to distinguish between the various forms of trust and their 
radius
10
 as they affect the population on different levels. Based on Fukuyama’s 
(Fukuyama, 2000) and Woolcock’s (1998, p.172) work while adding external 
enforcement to the picture, we can create a matrix incorporating the radius of 
trust and the level of intra-community and extra-community ties to examine the 
different forms of trust and see if there is need for formal external enforcement 
(Table 1).  
  In case of low level of out-of-group networks and intra-community ties, 
social exclusion can be detected as such people can benefit from neither group-
                                                     
9 We mean ‘social trust’ when using the term ‘trust’ in the forthcoming. 
10 Radius of trust: “that is, cooperative norms like honesty and reciprocity can be shared among 
limited groups of people and not with others in the same society.” (Fukuyama, 2000, p.17) The 
term “radius of trust” can be defined as the scope of individuals who are trusted. 
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membership nor the wider community. The radius of trust is almost non-existent 
in this case. 
 
Table 1. Community networks, radius of trust and need for formal external 
enforcement 
  Need for formal external enforcement   
 High Low   
Extra-
community 
network 
High 
Social 
individualism 
Social capital Wide 
Radius 
of 
trust 
Limited 
Loose 
communities/groups 
Close-knit 
communities/groups 
Limited 
Low Social exclusion Families Narrow 
  Low High   
  Intra-community trust   
Source: Based on the work of Fukuyama (2000) and Woolcock (1998, p.172) 
 
  At the other end of the scale we find social individuals, who are benefiting 
from an extended extra-community network, but do not feel that people can be 
trusted generally. This lack of trust has a wide-radius and can have corrosive 
effects to economic performance. 
  Familial trust (Fukuyama, 1995) is a narrow-radius form that exists on the 
level of family, creating a very close-knit group of relatives. Within ethnic, 
religious or any other form of groups wider – but not wide enough – trust can be 
detected limited to such group. Depending on the level of this intra-community 
trust, we can distinguish between loose and close-knit groups. These formations 
can be disruptive to wide-radius trust (Knack, 2001) and can negatively 
discriminate not just the outsiders, but as Woolcock (1998) argues, indirectly the 
insiders, too.  
  Although close communities can enhance efficiency and create a strong 
support base for members, the ability to utilize these relations while forging new 
ones outside the group as well is crucial on the long run. If it becomes successful 
on a large scale, social trust and social capital emerge.  
  In low trust formations, the access to formal external enforcement options 
is crucial as there is a high demand for them in the absence of trust. This need is 
basically identical with the demand for regulation, which controls in- and out-
group linkages as well. 
  In a society where several communities exist next to each other, but the 
extra-community ties remain limited, the externalities of such groups can tend to 
be high. People like to interact with individuals with similar values, or in other 
words with agents who are closer to them in the social space (Akerlof, 1997). 
The general views of these groups affect members’ choices significantly. 
Approval of friends and relatives means reinforcement for the individual and 
creates stronger bond within the community. 
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  The picture becomes even more complicated if different ethnic
11
 or racial 
groups are involved as is the case in the United Kingdom. Social trust declines 
when social distance
12
 increases (Zak and Knack, 2001), which process can be 
reversed if more similar persons interact or norms with wider radius emerge 
incorporating different classes or ethnic groups. Extending one’s external-
community links is not an easy task, as participating in social activity is less 
frequent among individuals living in areas that feature income inequality or 
racial and ethnical fragmentation. Alesina and La Ferrera (1999) found that “an 
increase in Gini by one standard deviation leads to a reduction in the probability 
of participation of 24 percentage points.” The same growth “in racial 
fragmentation implies a reduction in the propensity to participate of about 8 
percentage points. A similar result (6 percentage points) holds for the ethnic 
fragmentation.” (Alesina and La Ferrera, 1999, p.23) 
  In neighbourhoods where racial diversity is high deprivation is usually 
present as well causing a low number of interactions and destroying positive 
attitude among residents (Letki, 2008). The two factors reinforce each other and 
create a negative spillover effect resulting in a low level of interpersonal trust. 
  When there are communities that are internally homogenous but different 
from the other ones, the evolvement of trust is difficult as people tend to 
establish contact with similar persons (McPherson et al, 2001) and the exclusion 
effect of group dynamics work in the same time. 
  In the forthcoming, we will show that these two factors – concentrated 
highly diverse areas and tight communities living next to each other – together 
with deprivation of minority groups undermine trust in the United Kingdom as a 
result of the large number of racially and ethnically diverse immigrants entering 
the kingdom. In the next chapter, we first survey the immigration trends, and 
then examine the inequality data through deprivation measures. 
 
3. Immigration and inequality 
Although at the beginning of the 20
th
 century the UK was a net exporter of 
population, after the First World War the trend has been reversed as many Brits 
returned (Hicks and Allen, 1999, p.7). Later, after the Second World War, the 
country had to face not just several austerity measures, but also the constantly 
increasing problem of limited workforce. The government saw the solution in 
foreign immigrants and, as a result, thousands of foreigners chose the kingdom 
as their new home (Hicks and Allen, 1999), most of whom were blue collar 
workers. The cultural and demographic changes begun at the time created a 
                                                     
11 As ‘in British government research, minority ethnic groups are differentiated based on a 
combination of categories including ‘race’, skin colour, national and regional origins, and 
language’ (Office for National Statistics, 2003, p.7) we mean the same content when using the 
term ethnic group. 
12 We use the term ‘social distance’ as the social diversity of interacting agents. 
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process that has influenced the landscape of the country significantly in the 
upcoming years.  
In the ‘70s and ‘80s, emigration exceeded the number of immigrants as 
many Brits decided to live in Commonwealth countries. There was a significant 
drop in the level of emigrants choosing Canada as their destination in the 1980s, 
which further continued in the 1990s. The same process featured New Zealand 
and South Africa, while the number of immigrants coming from Other African 
Commonwealth countries, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan remained 
high throughout this thirty-year period (Hatton, 2005, p.723). 
A turnabout can be detected in the trend of European migration from the 
1980s as emigrants became outnumbered by the newcomers. The impact of the 
European Union citizens was especially fundamental – their number had been 
doubled within twenty years. 
Between 1981 and 1990 there were 1.2 million foreign immigrants (2% of 
population
13
 1991), while during the ‘90s, 1.7 million people (2.8% of 
population 2001) migrated to the UK in addition and on top of UK citizens 
moving back home (Hatton, 2005, p.723). Although we do not have any data 
before the ‘80s, in these two decades – when immigration started to rise 
considerably – the level of social trust amounted to 42%14. In the 2000s and 
afterwards
15
 – when immigration exceeded 16% – significantly (ten percentage 
points) less individuals were of the opinion that most people could be trusted, 
indicating overlaps in the two processes.  
Not just the number, but the skillset of immigrants has changed over time 
as well as the presence of skilled workers raised from 40% in 1971 to 72% in 
2000
16
, which shows a fundamental shift in the features of newcomers. Also, 
while during the ’70s a typical immigrant was between the age of 15-24, in the 
‘90s the number of people aged 25-44 increased significantly (Hatton, 2005). 
A larger expansion can be detected in 2004 when eight new member states 
(A8) won accession to the European Union (Figure 1). The number of 
immigrants remained roughly at the same level afterwards, although their 
composition changed.  
While the new EU citizens meant extra fifty-three thousand people living 
in the UK, a more or less equal number of Commonwealth immigrants arrived at 
the same time – on top of the annual 160,000 individuals (Office for National 
Statistics, 2010, p.3). The level of A8 immigrants more than doubled in three 
                                                     
13 Calculation based on figures of Hatton (2005) and Hicks and Allen (1999). 
14 There is no data available before the 1980s. In 1981 42.6%, while in 1991 42.2% of population 
thought that most people could be trusted in the UK. (WVS, 2008b) Sample size included 1479 
and 1788 individuals, respectively.  
15 In 1999 33.4% (UK data), while in 2006 30% (Great Britain data) trusted in general (WVS, 
2008c). Sample size consisted of 2000 and 1041 individuals, respectively. 
16 As a result of British policy that incentivised skilled immigration within the period. 
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years, reaching 112,000 in 2007, almost 90,000 of whom were Polish (Office for 
National Statistics, 2010). At the end of the decade half a million foreigners 
entered the United Kingdom with the purpose of living there, 30% of whom 
arrived from the European Union as compared to the 13% level in 2000.  
 
Figure 1. Migration - 1991-2009 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2010, p.1 
 
The number of immigrants aged 25-44 continued to increase with a sharp 
leap in 2004 and amounting to nearly half of all newcomers in 2009 (250,000), 
while the level of the older age group and youth under 15 remained low (below 
50,000 each) (Office for National Statistics, 2010, p.8). In the first decade of the 
century, millions of adults ready to work entered the UK (4.5 million altogether), 
but the White British population has not risen at all.  
The number of each and every minority ethnic group increased 
fundamentally more rapidly than the original population, but Mixed of White 
and Black African, Mixed of White and Asian, Other Mixed, Other Asian, Black 
African, Chinese and Other ethnic groups showed more than 5% enhancement 
annually. As a result, the Non-British population increased from 12.7% in 2001 
to 16.7% in 2009 (Office for National Statistics, 2011, p.2). 
Although the composition of these groups went through significant 
changes over the years, the extent of multiculturalism has grown rapidly since 
the ‘70s. 
On the other hand, income inequality rose significantly after 1984 
(Jenkins, 1995) overlapping the newly positive net immigration trend. Changes-
in-within-group-inequality contributed the most to the raise of total inequality in 
the ‘80s – more precisely “the increase in relative numbers of two comparatively 
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poor groups, single adult with and without children” (Jenkins, 1995, p.45). As 
we will see, minority ethnic communities were heavily affected in this respect. 
  The involvement of Mixed, Black African, Black Caribbean, and Other 
Blacks in these groups was much higher as their number in lone parent families 
was at least the double of White British, while 25%, 27%, 28% and 29% of 
them, respectively, belonged to one person households
17
 compared to 15% of 
their White counterparts (Office for National Statistics, 2006, p.89).  
  Also, the level of Black Caribbean (20%) and Black African (22%) 
parents with dependent children was more than four times higher than the White 
population’s (5%) and the involvement of Pakistani and Bangladeshi parents 
was higher with around 30% and 60%, respectively, in 1991 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2006, p.90). 
  On the other hand, one fifth of the increase in inequality between 1981 
and 1986 was caused by the rise of the numbers of non-elderly workless 
households (Jenkins, 1995). The proportion of these households within the 
ethnic minorities is almost double in the case of Indians, Black Caribbeans, 
Chinese, and almost triple or more than triple in the case of Mixed, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Other Asian, Black Africans and Other Blacks compared to the 
White British group (Office for National Statistics, 2006, p.110).  
  The situation is even more worrying from a deprivation point of view, 
when we examine the level of households with dependent children but with no 
working adults. Except Chinese and Indians, all ethnic minorities are 
significantly more exposed than the White British population. In the case of 
Other Blacks, Bangladeshis, Black Africans and Mixed individuals, the rate is 
two to one, meaning that these groups are affected twice as much as the majority 
of population (Office for National Statistics, 2006, p.101). 
  We may conclude that within-group inequality is more substantial in these 
minority communities and, as a result, they were more exposed to the growing 
inequality trend started in the ‘80s than the White population causing to be 
subject of deprivation to a much larger extent. The process has not changed ever 
since as data shows the same pattern in the subsequent years as well. 
Unemployment figures are analysed in the forthcoming to highlight more recent 
deprivation among minority ethnic groups. 
  We consider White British unemployment rate as baseline, which was 4% 
among women and 6% among men in England and Wales in 2001
18
.  White 
Irish, Other White, Indian and Chinese men’s unemployment exposure is around 
the same level matching the one of White British. On the other hand, Other 
Asian, Mixed White and Asian, Other Mixed and Pakistani men are affected 
                                                     
17 Data shows all families except pensioners. 
18 Data is for working age population, thus men aged 16-64 and women aged 16-59. (Office for 
National Statistics, 2006) 
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more than double than their White British counterparts. In the case of all the 
Black and Mixed White and Black ethnic groups this rate is three to one.   
  Except two cases (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis) the percentages of 
unemployed women are below the level of men (Office for National Statistics, 
2006, p.122). White Irish women’s figure is the same as White British (4%), but 
all the others are close to or above the line of twice the baseline. Exceptionally 
high numbers are accompanied by the Black African, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
groups (16%, 18%, 22% respectively). Also, if we take into consideration the 
decomposition of unemployment rate by religion, we find that Muslim 
individuals have by far the highest figures. People belonging to Buddhist, Sikh 
or Other religion, or those who are not religious at all are 1.5 times more 
affected than Christians.  
  Also, there are significant differences among individuals within the same 
ethnic group but with different religions. For example, White British Muslims’ 
and Other White Muslims’ unemployment rates are around three times higher 
than Christians and Jews with the same ethnic background (e.g. it is 19% among 
White British Muslim men, while just 4% within their Jews counterparts). 
Similarly large differences can be detected within the Black African ethnic 
group (Office for National Statistics, 2006). The unemployment rate gap 
between Muslim (28%) and Christian males (16%) is 12 percentage points and 
16 percentage points between women (31% and 14% respectively) (Office for 
National Statistics, 2006, p.122).  
  Based on the mentioned statistics, we can conclude that minority ethnic 
groups are exposed to socio-economic inequality and deprivation at a much 
larger extent than White British individuals. As we have discussed in chapter 2, 
income inequality and deprivation makes extra-community links decrease 
drastically, thus ethnic groups’ high exposure to these aspects initiates social 
fragmentation.  
  The number of newcomers was growing year by year reaching 16.7% of 
total population in 2009 (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Their effect on the 
society’s structure increased substantially as the level of social trust has dropped 
by twelve percentage points since the 1980s when emigrants became 
outnumbered by the newcomers
19
 (WVS, 2008c). 
  Currently, around every fifth person is racially and ethnically different 
and their weight in influencing the social landscape is even larger due to their 
high concentration in certain areas, i.e. in London and the South East (Office for 
National Statistics, 2006).  
 
 
                                                     
19 There is data of social trust by ethnicity available, but the sub-sample sizes are extremely small 
making them unsuitable for analysis.   
THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE     131 
3.1. Geographic concentration and homogeneity 
  In the following, in order to show the geographic concentration we use 
diversity indexes representing the probability of an event that two randomly 
chosen persons within a given area will belong to different groups. “Scores are 
classed as highly diverse if they are 0.5 or higher” (Office for National Statistics, 
2006, p.74), which means there is 50% or more chance to such event described 
above. In most areas, a low level of religious diversity was typical as 76% of 
authorities had diversity scores of 0.10 or less and in the case of 7% of them the 
score was only 1% or below it in 2001. High scores (equal to or above 50%) 
could be detected in just 3% of all the areas – in North London, Leicester and 
Slough.  
  From an ethnical point of view we can say that the kingdom is a little bit 
more diverse as 59% had diversity scores below 0.11 and 21% had a figure equal 
to or less than 5%. Still, we can say that the UK is quite homogenous and the 
distribution of the ethnically and religiously different individuals is concentrated 
on similar territories. 
 In some areas, the chance to randomly meet an ethnically different person 
is just 2%. The largest number of people with different background is 
concentrated in London as 39% of Muslims, 42% of Indians and almost 80% of 
Black Africans have chosen the capital as their place of living (Office for 
National Statistics, 2006). The relatively large number of ethnically, racially and 
religiously different individuals is accompanied by high geographical 
concentration strengthening their society-changing effect. 
  Numbers show that White British people live in the least diverse areas 
(with a diversity score of 0.16), while Black Africans tend to choose territories 
with the largest ethnical differences (score of 0.61). In many cases, variations are 
at least fivefold and there are enormous variances between majority and minority 
population (Office for National Statistics, 2006, p.76). We shall highlight that 
White British people tend not to mix, while minority groups prefer highly 
versatile environment making the interaction with individuals outside of their 
communities difficult. Such a limitation on extra-community linkages lead to 
disintegration that can be detected in household homogeneity data as well. 
 Statistics of households
20
 with complete homogeneity shows the 
percentages of families where all members share the household reference 
person’s (HRP) ethnic and racial background (Office for National Statistics, 
2006). 97% of White British households live in complete homogeneity, while 
the minority groups’ figures varies between 53% and 85% representing a lower 
level of consistency, but still a high level of homogeneousness.  
Comparing the households from a religious perspective, we find unified 
families. Except for three groups (Any other religion, No religion and 
                                                     
20 Data is available from 2001. 
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Buddhists), in 70% to 90% of cases people live with religiously identical 
individuals. Christians’ figures show exceptional homogeneity as only one 
percentage of households includes persons from different religions, which 
corresponds to the high level of ethnic homogeneity within the White British 
group. Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims tend to live with more religiously dissimilar 
individuals as around one in ten of them choose to do so.  Buddhists and 
members of Any other religion had the highest level of religious heterogeneity 
as twenty-two and twenty-three percentage of them, respectively, contained 
person/s from a different religion to the HRP  (Office for National Statistics, 
2006, p.13).  
In summary we can say that people prefer religiously and ethnically 
homogenous households. It creates culturally tight families with a suspected 
high level of within-group trust
21
, but it also means that they rely on a low level 
of social network outside the family thus creating many small separate 
communities living next to each other without links.  
On the other hand, a further contributing factor to the social fragmentation 
is the language barrier. Although it is hard to record the number of people living 
in the UK and having little command of English language, estimates suggested a 
figure of 1.5 million in 2001 (Schellekens, 2001). It meant that 33% of 
foreigners did not speak English at a sufficient level to function within society or 
labour market. If we take into account that this figure was based on the 
assumption that in 2001 the number of second language speakers with 
inadequate English knowledge was threefold of the 1991 level, we can 
extrapolate the value and come up with an estimate of 4.5 million in 2011. Also, 
there is a large difference between the different linguistic groups in terms of 
language skills. More than three times more Chinese speaking people know 
English on a survival level than Bengali speaking individuals and almost 
fourfold is the difference between Gujerati and Punjabi linguistic groups 
regarding zero level English knowledge. Except for the Chinese group, one 
feature is common though, the number of individuals who pass all levels is 
under 5%, which is extremely low (The Working Group on ESOL, 2000, p.10). 
This extent of lack of fluency severely affects people’s ability to secure 
employment and be involved in the English speaking community or enjoy the 
several social services ensured by the government. Asking for help e.g. legal aid 
or being aware of the different opportunities present in the kingdom becomes 
impossible for this segment of the population thus hindering their economic and 
social circumstances, or even causing social exclusion. It also may explain some 
part of the disproportionally high unemployment rate among immigrants and it 
certainly contributes to the fractionalisation from White British society.  
                                                     
21 No data available on it unfortunately.  
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These findings are in line with the theoretical evidence about how 
newcomers influence existing community members as they feel like turning into 
strangers in their environment due to the recognisably different ethnic, racial, 
linguistic and cultural background of the immigrants.  
The effect is even larger when the movement is concentrated geographically 
as residents lose the sense of control over their neighbourhood (Andrews, 2011). 
Also, the process is further strengthened by the continuous change in the 
newcomers’ communities. Two and a half times more immigrants entered the 
UK in 2009 (250,000) intending to stay for up to two years than those who 
wished to leave in the next four-year period (100,000) and just around 28% 
thought that they would stay permanently or longer than four years. An ever-
changing social and cultural scene is created, which hinders the integration of 
newcomers. 
As a consequence, we arrive to our initial hypothesis of several 
communities living next to each other but not interacting, which is supported by 
the statistics analysed above. As we have seen, the different ethnic, racial and 
religious groups possess limited level of extra-community links, with the White 
British group as the ethnically most isolated one. On the other hand, the ethnic 
minority groups are exposed to income inequality and disadvantageous socio-
economic factors to a much higher degree. These two features – the 
fragmentation of different socio-groups together with minorities heavily 
influenced by poor financial status – strengthen each other’s negative effects on 
social cohesion (through limiting extra-community networks) and generate a 
spiral society-wide trust-eliminating process. 
 
3.2.  Access to justice 
One further trust-influencing aspect can be detected in the kingdom. The 
ethnic minorities’ limited access to legal advice and to the possibility of formal 
external enforcement hinders social trust to emerge. Although the rule of law is 
exceptionally high in the kingdom and anti-discriminatory regulations have a 
long history, solicitor rates are excessive.  
In the final report of Lord Justice Rupert Jackson (2010) on civil litigation 
costs, he starts the foreword with the following statement: “In some areas of 
civil litigation costs are disproportionate and impede access to justice.” (Jackson, 
2010, p.i) 
Financial resources are essential in this context as, without sufficient 
resources, access to justice is very much limited or eliminated. “If neither party 
has adequate funding, the litigation will not happen. If only one party has 
adequate funding, the litigation will be a walk over” (Jackson, 2010, p.41).  
In order to overcome some part of the cost burden, legal aid has been 
introduced in the 1950s, which has gone through significant changes over time. 
Currently an independent government agency, the Legal Service Commission is 
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in charge under the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Jackson, 2010b). Aid is 
available for advice and litigation services for case types listed in the Act and 
based upon financial eligibility. Except for two cases – immigration and mental 
health tribunals – full funding is not an option as the main priority is to help with 
early advice to avoid as many court proceedings as possible. 
Entitlement for aid depends on gross and disposable income and disposable 
capital. Under the statutory charge, it is ensured that the legally aided client’s 
recovered money or property is to be used to pay any outstanding balance on the 
client’s legal aid account, thus Legal Aid can be seen as a zero rate lender as 
well. On the other hand, there is a trend of diminishing financial eligibility since 
the programme’s initial establishment. In the beginning, 80% of the population 
was entitled for legal aid, while in 2007 just 30% classified (Jackson, 2010c). 
Several concerns have been voiced about its considerable impact on limiting 
access to justice as aid plays an important role due to exceptionally high solicitor 
fees.  
Guideline hourly rates – published by Her Majesty’s Court Service annually 
– vary according to geographic location and the experience of the solicitor (Band 
A to D). While in the City of London the hourly rate of a well-experienced 
lawyer is around £400, out-of-London rates are just around the half of it (Her 
Majesty’s Court Service, 2012). Moreover, significant variations can be detected 
according to the solicitor’s background, but comparing each figure to minimal 
wage (adult rate of £5.80 per hour), the excessiveness of fees is evident. 
Although the kingdom provides a high quality regulatory framework, the 
benefits of such system can be utilized on a limited level in low-income 
households. These restrains on access to justice further impede out-of group 
interactions as formal external enforcement is not ensured. In the same time, 
within-community trust cannot act as an enforcement tool either due to the lack 
of extra-community network.  
The examined four main factors reinforce each other’s effects thus creating 
a fragmented social structure where social trust does not emerge. The main 
findings of our analysis can be summarised as follows: 
1. Racial ethnical and cultural heterogeneity is a result of immigration 
2. Minority ethnic groups are heavily affected by income inequality and 
deprivation 
3. Minorities are geographically highly concentrated and people prefer 
religiously and ethnically homogenous households  
4. Points 1. – 3. destroy social cohesion through limiting extra-community 
links and lead to fragmentation of the society 
5. Although the legal system is clear and transparent, the availability of it by 
low-income sub-population is low. 
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6. As a result of points 4. and 5., low-trust environment is present as neither 
formal nor informal external enforcement is ensured for minorities outside 
their close-knit communities. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The initial puzzle of the current paper was the paradox of high quality 
formal institutional background combined with the low level of social trust in 
the United Kingdom. 
As traditional social capital literature was not able to explain the 
phenomenon, we proposed a comprehensive approach including the analysis of 
immigration, integration, inequality and access to justice data set. They were 
examined in the matrix of extra-community network, intra-community trust, 
radius of trust and need for formal external enforcement. 
Four factors – concentrated highly diverse areas, tight communities living 
next to each other with limited extra-community links, ethnic minorities’ high 
exposure to deprivation and limited access to justice – have been highlighted as 
the origin of our puzzle.  
Income inequality played a significant role in creating social fragmentation. 
It rose considerably after 1984 (Jenkins, 1995) overlapping the newly positive 
net immigration trend. Changes-in-within-group-inequality contributed the most 
to the raise of total inequality in the ‘80s – more precisely ‘the increase in 
relative numbers of two comparatively poor groups, single adult with and 
without children’ (Jenkins, 1995, p.45). Minority ethnic communities were 
heavily affected in this respect and were exposed to socio-economic inequality 
and deprivation at a much larger extent than White British individuals. As 
discussed in the theoretical overview, income inequality and deprivation makes 
extra-community links decrease drastically, thus ethnic groups’ high exposure to 
these aspects initiates social fragmentation.  
The analysis also showed that minorities are geographically highly 
concentrated and that people prefer religiously and ethnically homogenous 
households. It creates culturally tight families with a suspected high level of 
within-group trust, but it also means that they can rely on a low level of social 
network outside the family thus creating many small separate communities 
living next to each other without linkages. 
As we have seen, the different ethnic, racial and religious groups possess a 
limited level of extra-community link. On the other hand, the ethnic minority 
groups are disposed to income inequality and disadvantageous socio-economic 
factors to a much higher degree. These two aspects – the fragmentation of 
different socio-groups together with minorities heavily influenced by poor 
financial status – strengthen each other’s negative effects on social cohesion 
(through limiting extra-community networks) and generate a spiral society-wide 
trust-eliminating process. 
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Although the kingdom provides a high quality regulatory framework, the 
benefits of such a system can be utilized at a limited level in low income 
households. These restrains on access to justice further impede out-of group 
interactions as formal external enforcement is not ensured. At the same time, 
within-community trust cannot act as an enforcement tool either due to the lack 
of extra-community network.  
As a result of the analysed features, close-knit but separated communities 
exist next to each other without integrating in the White British society. Due to 
the lack of sufficient level of linkages paired with the deficiency of external 
enforcement in minority ethnic groups, social trust declined since the 1980s and 
cannot emerge until social structure issues are not addressed. Although high 
quality formal institutional background plays a significant role in creating social 
trust, we have shown that it represents only a necessary condition, not a 
sufficient one. As most scholars find social trust to be a fundamental factor in 
enhancing economic growth, the trust-impeding mechanisms explored in the 
current paper shall be of great importance. 
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